Sorry Ken, you’re wrong…
Sorry Ken, you’re wrong. At last month’s PMI Synergy Event – billed as a celebration of project management – former London Mayor Ken Livingstone stood up to denounce the talents of UK project leaders.
Central to Ken’s argument was the assertion that if you want something doing properly, bring in outside help. He cited Americans Barbara Cassani and Bob Kiley as prime examples. But if you look closer, it’s far from an open and shut case.
Less than a year into the Olympic bid Ms Cassani decided she wasn’t cut out to lead the bid. She wasn’t taken with the idea of hanging around the bars and lobbies of international hotels trying to catch the eye of IOC members. So she waved farewell.
Her replacement, Lord Coe (a Brit), took up the challenge, and the rest as they say, is history. Now with the build programme 95 per cent complete, British project heavy-hitters Sir John Armitt, Jeremy Beeton, Howard Shiplee, Ian Crockford etc, are credited with bringing the programme in on time and under budget.
The case for Bob Kiley is equally vague. Mr Kiley came with a big reputation – and salary. He had previously been credited with fixing Boston and New York’s ailing transport systems. But when he left six years later, his achievements (or lack of them) left Londoners scratching their heads if the million pound plus annual salary had really been worth it.
As both cases prove there is no magic bullet and bringing in outside help to ride roughshod over the establishment is no guarantee of success – as was proven by Mr Kiley’s ongoing court saga to overturn the government’s contentious PPP plan.
Ah, but what about The Thames Barrier project – the very definition of British PM ineffectiveness?
Recalling his experiences on the Greater London Council, Ken said the Barrier contract had been drawn up in such a convoluted way that it did nothing to encourage delivery and everyone working on it – from the chief executive to the tea lady – knew that once project was over so was their job.
No surprise then that the project slipped; ran over massively and came within weeks of failing to prevent catastrophic flooding in the capital.
But hang-on a minute, did it do its job and prevent the flooding? Has London suffered catastrophic flooding since its construction? Are there any plans to replace it in the near future? The Environment Agency’s Rachel Hill is quoted as saying: “We don’t anticipate any major engineering projects in the Thames Estuary before 2030.”
So come on Ken, why not bite the bullet? Admit that you did it to fit your own agenda, flog a few books, and that every now and again, British really is best.
James Simons
James is editor of Project magazine.
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There are series of challenges in any organisation attempting to run projects from within an established bureaucracy and it’s a world-wide problem.
First the very senior managers in the organisation like the system the way it is because they succeeded in the system as is and rarely actually want change. The corollary is if they don’t like it they are the only ones with the power to change it.
Bureaucracies confuse process with governance – process is a tool to assist in governance but only if the process helps achieve the objectives of the organisation. Restrictive and obstructive processes are BAD governance. These processes are rarely removed because of items 1 and 3.
There are few or no rewards in the senior ranks for taking personal responsibility for project and/or program outcomes. However, if a person is personally associated with a failure it is career damaging. Given every project has a degree of risk it is not in any managers long term career interests to take responsibility for a project if the two outcomes for them personally are a choice between neutral and negative.
For projects to succeed the key elements are skilled people and a supportive sponsor who is senior enough to champion the work effectively and takes personal responsibility for the outcome! These factors were clearly evident in the Olympic building program but are rarely seen in any government bureaucracy anywhere.
This topic has been the focus of a series of blogs and linked-in discussions I’ve been involved in over the last couple of months, the summary is at: http://mosaicprojects.wordpress.com/?cat=16505
James
Good article
I was at Synergy too and I took away a different message from Ken's talk. He was clearly very frustrated with the management of projects by committees within the civil service, but he was also playing a political game. He was saying that Govenment (Local and National) are not good at running projects because of the complex bureaucracy and decision making processes, a big sweeping generalisation, but I think he was reflecting his own real experience. He was also making a political point, that in setting up arms length deliver authorities then public projects can be delivered more effectively, and he Ken was instrumental in implementing these new ways of working. I saw it as part of the Ken's re-election story, "2012 was a success because of the way I set it up". I could not comment on the truth of this, but it's a good story if he wants to be re-elected.
Are delivery authorites the best way of managing public projects?
The real live issue for project management is the effectiveness of the arms length delivery authorities. I have seen a real trend for these to be seen as the new panacea for public project delivery. The politicial class seem to be convinced. Several major public project organisations seem to moving towards this model, but will it work? This is especial important given a planed significant expenditure on infrastructure projects, "in order to stimulate the economy". The danger is that the money will be spent to create jobs, not deliver great projects.
What can we learn from Ken's experience?
LUL PPP is not a good case study. Having worked in this sector for a while, Bob Kiley, or anyone was doomed to failure because of the conflicts of interest and complexity within the PPP structures. These made difficult projects impossibly complex. So I wouldn't use that as a case study to prove anything. Likewise the 2012 programme is exceptional.
I can see the attraction of moving delivery of major public projects away from the direct influence of those with a short term political interest but will this work in the much more complex areas of defence and public transport. These are inherently political and affect the day to day lives of many individuals, so maybe they should be managed by public servants. I don't know the answers to these questions but it is certainly going to be interesting finding out over the next few years.
My personal view it that the competence and capability of the team is more important than the structure in which they work. A project management consultant, I have the honour of meeting many hundreds of project managers in a year and I meet outstanding managers in many types of organisation. As my boss used to say "People Make Projects"